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Taxation Without Coordination
Julie Roin*
Traditional conceptions of the nation-state have been challenged by the growth of
the global economy. As increasing numbers of business transactions span international
borders, frustrated participants point out the high costs of complying with disparate and
even conflicting national laws. Ever more frequently, they espouse various forms of and
methods for achieving an international convergence of legal rules. Some call for
international agreements establishing uniform laws while others argue for the less
complete convergence of “harmonization,” but all propose limiting the national
prerogatives responsible for legal diversity. Despite these entreaties, actual movement in
the direction of uniformity has been painfully slow.
Several factors could account for the slow pace of change. One is that the benefits
of uniformity are less than they appear to the proponents of such measures. While
convergence may be helpful some of the time, over the entire range of affected cases
diversity yields greater benefits. Another possible explanation, however, is less benign.
Drawing on public choice theory, it posits that the untoward influence of interest groups
prevents even beneficial instances of legal convergence. The survival of legal diversity,
then, merely provides another example of special interest groups prospering at the
expense of the general public. Put differently, interest group pressure forestalls legal
convergence except in cases where it would lead to extraordinary gains.
Because gains from legal convergence often are hard to quantify, it can be quite
difficult definitively to ascribe the absence of convergence as resulting from one or
another of these factors. Often, the most that can be said is that the political barriers to
change should make us suspicious of the slow pace of change. But what are these
barriers, exactly? How do they arise and what, if anything, can be done about them?
This article uses one context in which the case for international harmonization or
coordination has been pressed by academics, the definition of income for income tax
purposes, as a case study in the general problem of public choice influences on the
harmonization process. In particular, it argues that one reason tax base harmonization has
so little political visibility (let alone viability) is that such convergence would generate
diffuse benefits and concentrated losses. By focusing on the institutional and attitudinal
impediments to tax base harmonization, the article shows how international tax policy
can be as susceptible to domestic political concerns and interests as any piece of national
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legislation. It also speculates on measures that may be used to overcome these obstacles
to harmonization.
This article is not intended as a paean to the virtues of tax base harmonization;
indeed, reasonable people motivated solely by public-spirited concerns, may prefer to
allow full or partial diversity in income definitions at the national level to adherence to an
international standard. Many of the substantive objections to harmonized rules in general
may apply to the particular case of tax base determinations. The point is, instead, to
detail the difficulties faced by those who want to launch a discussion of these substantive
issues, and by implication, those of other harmonization proposals.
For the lessons of this article to be meaningful, one must first believe that the
concept of tax base harmonization has at least a surface plausibility. Therefore, the first
part of the article shows why tax base harmonization may be desirable. The second part
attempts to show why, despite such desirability, significant impediments to reaching such
a unified definition of taxable income exist. The third part suggests actions that may be
taken to make such an agreement more likely.

A. The Benefits of Tax Base Harmonization
The problems created by the differences in national income tax rates have long
been discussed. Indeed, over the last decade, a concerted effort has been made to
“harmonize” or “coordinate” national tax rates, particularly in the area of capital income
taxation.1 These efforts led to the adoption of a provisional agreement among European
Union members on how to tax interest income earned by foreign investors.2 Although
the ultimate implementation of this agreement remains in doubt, academics have begun to

1

See Communication from the Commission to the Council: Towards tax co-ordination in the
European Union, A package to tackle harmful tax competition, COM (97 )495 final at 2, ¶3 (noting
that tax competition “reduces the room for manoeuver to meet other Community objectives...”);
O R G A NIZ AT IO N FOR E CONOMIC C O -O P E RA T IO N A N D D E V EL OP M E N T, H ARM FUL T AX C OM PE TIT IO N : A N
E M E R G IN G G LOB AL I SSUE 14 ¶23 (19 98) [hereinafter HA RM FUL T AX C O M P E TIT IO N ] (stating that tax
competition “may hamper the application of progressive tax rates and the achievement of redistributive
goals”).
2

See Joe Kirwin, EU States Agree to Long-Term Framework For Cross-Border Tax on
Savings Income, 120 D A IL Y T AX R EP ’T GG-2 (June 21, 2000). Under the agreement, affected
countries will have a choice between imposing withholding taxes on such income at a specified rate
or providing the home countries of those investors with enough information to enable them to levy a
home country tax on such income. The plan includes a transitional tax rate of 15 p ercen t, starting in
2003, with the tax-collecting jurisd iction retaining only 25 percent of the taxes so collected and the
remainder being remitted to the state in w hich the nonresident lives. See Joe Kirwin, EU Finance
Ministers Reach Accord On C ross-Border Savings Income Levy, D A IL Y T AX R EP ’T G-1 (11/28/00 ).
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discuss the possibility of taking the next step, of “harmonizing” tax bases by developing
a uniformly applicable definition of taxable income.
Although tax lawyers, and particularly academic tax lawyers, like tidy solutions,
the impetus for the idea of tax base harmonization stems from more than a generalized
preference for elegant design. The alleged benefits of uniformity come from two quite
disparate sources. A widely recognized source of such gains is administrative
convenience. The other, and perhaps more important source at the international level, is
the elimination of tax arbitrage. Each is discussed in more detail below.
1. Administrative Advantages
The most obvious advantages to having a uniform definition of income are
administrative. Uniformity would allow taxpayers to provide identical information, often
on identical forms, to each of several governments, rather than generating separate
accounts and forms for each one. This would vastly reduce many enterprises’ accounting
costs. Even partial convergence could generate significant savings. One needs only think
of the difference between the time necessary to fill out one’s individual federal return and
one’s state return to appreciate the significance of standardization. Though state returns
may be onerous, especially when taxpayers have to file contemporaneously in several
different states,3 they would be considerably more difficult if taxpayers had to create
separate income schedules, applying different realization and recognition rules,
depreciation schedules and the like, instead of starting with the “adjusted gross income”
figure calculated for purposes of the federal return. Whatever frustration individuals
would feel as a result of dealing with an unharmonized system would be (and currently is)
magnified for corporate taxpayers. Corporations engage in more numerous and more
complex transactions, generating more significant discontinuities in treatment across
jurisdictions. These discontinuities often reverberate in future years, creating additional
discontinuities in related transactions. For example, when jurisdictions use different
depreciation schedules, the amount of gain calculated upon the sale of a partially
depreciated asset differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as do the pre-sale calculations
of income derived from use of the asset. Differences in realization and recognition rules
also affect several years’ returns.
Taxpayers, then, would enjoy lower tax preparation costs in a tax base
harmonized world. Governments would benefit from similar economies in the processing
and enforcement arenas. Tax administration and enforcement could become much
simpler. Given preexisting differences in language and culture and the political
sensitivities that are implicated in the operation of a tax system, it strains credulity to

3

Although the states of the United States utilize fairly consistent definitions of taxable
income, they have not agreed on a common formula for allocating multistate income among taxing
jurisdictions. See TAN 82-84 infra.
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believe that standardization would lead to the creation of a single international tax
enforcement agency. However, with that vision in the background, one can readily see
areas for profitable coordination. Exchanges of information would be much more
meaningful if the tax authorities knew that they were comparing apples to apples rather
than to oranges. Further, taxpayer information could be provided on forms compatible
with the computer systems of other countries, making possible the processing of large
amounts of exchanged material, something that is currently impossible and undoubtedly
makes tax evasion easier.4
Uniform, or near uniform, rules regarding more extraordinary transactions also
could benefit both taxpayers and their governments. Currently, changes in business
structure or organization often must be configured to satisfy different criteria established
by several jurisdictions.5 At a minimum, this entails hiring expert legal or financial
representation in each country; less easily quantifiable costs may be imposed by the need
to construct or maintain convoluted corporate or transactional structures. In the worst
case, valuable business opportunities may be forgone as a result of unavoidably adverse
tax consequences.6 Governments bear some of these costs. In addition to the adverse
affects on business expansion, governments may suffer increased governance costs.
Taxpayers may take advantage of costly governmental administrative and dispute
resolution mechanisms when attempting to cope (successfully or unsuccessfully) with the
inconsistent demands of different jurisdictions. Even the substantial fee levied on
taxpayers taking advantage of the letter-ruling process7 likely fails to compensate the U.S.
government for the full costs of responding to requests for guidance as to the tax
treatment of these uniquely convoluted transactions.
Other dispute resolution facilities, such as courts and competent authority, also
provide taxpayer services at government expense. Though taxpayers incur some of the
costs of such institutions, taxpayers in general fund a sizeable percentage of the overall
costs. Many litigated cases involve disputes about tax base definitions. One perennial
question in the United States has been whether a particular foreign tax can be deemed an
“income tax” even though its base calculation methods differ from U.S. methods with

4

See IRS Foreign Information Returns Program, 62 T AX N OTES 411, 413-414 (January
24,1994) (detailing technical barriers to e ffective use of foreign tax info rmatio n); David Spencer,
OECD Information Exchange Recommendations Are A Significant First Step In Resolving Tax
Evasion, 8 J. I N T ’L T AX ’N 353, 389 (1997).
5

See Thoma s L. Evans, Respecting F oreign Merg ers Under U.S. Tax Law, 88 T AX N OTES
93, 99 (July 3, 2000).
6

Id.

7

See Rev. Proc. 98-1, 1998 -1 C.B. 7 (establishing schedule of user fees in Appendix A).
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respect to timing rules, deduction allowances or gross receipts formulas.8 Differences
spill over into other areas as well, ranging from technical issues such as whether to use
U.S. or foreign tax principles for purposes of calculating the amount of “accumulated
profits” under the foreign tax credit rules9 to transfer pricing allocations.10 Similar
disputes undoubtedly arise at the administrative level. Again, greater harmonization of
the underlying tax rules should reduce or eliminate such costs.

Administrative costs may be reduced still further because the standardization of
tax base definitions may allow for some simplification of the underlying tax rules. For
example, some aspects of the complicated foreign tax credit provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code can be traced to the need to compensate for differences between the
operation of the U.S. income tax system and that of other countries. To understand how
and why this is true, one must first understand, at least in general terms, how the tax
credit works.
Under international norms, income can be taxed by the country within whose
borders it has been generated (the “country of source”) as well as by the taxpayer’s
country of residence and (if an individual) the taxpayer’s country of citizenship.
Obviously, if each such country exercised its full taxing authority, most international
8

See, e.g., Bank of America v. United States, 459 F.2d 513 (Ct.Cl. 1972) (differences allowed
because tax still reached net gain); Keasbey & M attison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d. 894 (3 rd Cir.)
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739 (1943) (differences precluded treatment as an income tax). While taxpayers
may deduct all business-related taxes in calculating their income for tax purposes, foreign income and
“in lieu of” taxes m ay be c redited on a dollar for dollar basis against U.S . incom e tax liab ility. See
I.R.C. §§ 901 and 903. The econ omic difference be tween the two treatme nts is substantial. See
J OSEPH I SENBERGH , I N T ER N A TIO N AL T A XA T IO N 123-124 (2000) (explaining value of credit over
deduction). Elaborate regulations promulgated by Treasury in 1983 und er section 901 spelling out
allowa ble variations, see Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2, merely stemmed and d id not halt such litigation. See,
e.g., Texasgulf, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 51 (1996) (profit for purposes of Ontario Mining Tax
sufficiently like “net gain” even though calculated by deducting a “processing allowance” rather than
actual business expe nses). See generally Glenn E. Coven, International Comity and the Foreign Tax
Cred it: Crediting Nonconforming Taxes, 4 FLA . T AX R EV . 83, 94-110 (19 99) (detailing administrative
and judicial history o f definitional dispute). Such disputes are now o ften reso lved p rospectively
through bilateral tax treaties. See C HARLES I. K IN G S O N A N D C YNTHIA B L UM , I NTERNATIONAL
T A X A TIO N 565 (1998) (problem arises mainly with taxes levied by non-treaty countries or at subfederal levels).

9

See United States v. Good year T ire & Rub ber C o., 49 3 U .S. 13 2 (1989 ).

10

See Texaco v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d 825 (5 th Cir. 19 96), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1185
(1997) (foreign law rather than fair market value determined transfer price of oil between related
entities); Pro ctor & Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 961 F2d 1255 (6 th Cir. 1992) (foreign law use d to
limit of royalty payments allocated under section 482).
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transactions would be taxed out of existence. Generally speaking, international norms
require the country of residence to take steps to avoid crippling duplicative taxation.
Although some countries meet this obligation by excluding foreign source income from
their tax base, the United States protects its residents by allowing them to credit foreign
income taxes against their U.S. income tax liability. The amount of this credit is limited
to the amount of the taxpayer’s U.S. tax liability multiplied by a fraction, the numerator
of which is the taxpayer’s foreign source income for the year and the denominator of
which is the taxpayer’s worldwide income for the year.11 The amount of credit allowed
after application of this “foreign tax credit limitation” essentially corresponds to the
amount of U.S. tax due with respect to the taxpayer’s foreign income, thus reserving to
the United States a full income tax on income sourced within its borders. For example,
suppose a taxpayer subject to tax in the United States at a 38% rate earned $2000 from
sources in the United States and $1000 from sources in France, which levied a 40%
($400) tax. This taxpayer would be allowed to claim only $38012 in foreign tax credits,
leaving a residual U.S. income tax liability of $760.13 Twenty dollars of the French tax
would be non-creditable (i.e. could not be used to offset U.S. income taxes due on other,
U.S. source income) and non-refundable (the government would not send her a $20 check
if, for example, that French-source $1000 was her only income), unlike, for example, the
earned-income tax credit or the credit for taxes withheld by one’s (U.S.) employer on
one’s salary income. The effect of denying the taxpayer a credit for this $20 is to cause
the taxpayer, rather than the federal treasury, to bear the burden of the higher French tax
rate.14
Congress realized almost immediately that for the foreign tax credit limitation to
work properly, credits must offset the U.S. tax due in the tax year the credit-generating
foreign income is reported for U.S. tax purposes. Its first formulation of this rule often
did not allow this to happen. Because foreign taxes, like U.S. taxes, are payable in the
year after the associated income is earned, Congress discovered that all too often “the
credit is taken against the United States tax for the year following the year in which was
earned the income on which the foreign tax was imposed...” As a result, taxpayers found
themselves unable to claim tax credits for the full amount of foreign income taxes paid,
even when those source taxes had been levied at rates lower than U.S. rates. To solve this
problem, in 1924 Congress amended what was then section 222 of the 1921 Internal
Revenue Code to allow taxpayers generally on the cash method to claim the foreign tax

11

I.R.C. § 904(a).

12

$380 = 1000/3000 X 1140.

13

$760 = 2000 X .38 = 1140 - 380.

14

France also bears the burden of this disallowance because it lessens the attraction of France
for U.S. investors.

6

1/15 /02 d raft

credit on an accrual basis.15 Congress later became concerned about double taxation
caused “because of the manner in which this country-by-country limitation works where
the methods of reporting income are different in the United States and the foreign
country.”16 It thereupon provided for the creditability of foreign taxes that oscillated
between “too high” and “too low” (by U.S. standards) because of differences in
realization and other timing rules by allowing taxpayers to carry excess credits back two
years and forward five years. These carryover credits can be used to offset U.S. income
tax owed with respect to foreign source income after the application of the carryover
year’s foreign tax credit.17 By its terms, this carryover and carryback is not limited to
later-reported income generated by such legal mismatches; as long the total amount of the
credits being claimed do not exceed the carryover year’s foreign tax credit limitation
amount, the carryover credits may be used to offset U.S. taxes due on unrelated (to the
foreign income underlying the carryover credit amount) foreign-source income.
Practically from the beginning, commentators noted the under-inclusive nature of
this remedy. 18 Experience also has shown it to be over-inclusive; the existence of this
extensive window period allows taxpayers additional opportunities to search for (and
often create) low-taxed foreign income to make excess foreign tax credits creditable.
Because the foreign tax credit limitation does not apply on an item-by-item basis, but
allows taxpayers to group items of income and their associated tax payments prior to its
application, taxpayers with excess credits often seek to earn low-taxed foreign income to
“blend” with their high-tax income, thus bringing the total amount of foreign tax below
the limitation amount. For example, if the taxpayer described above earned an additional
$1000 in Japan, which was taxed in Japan at a 15% rate, its foreign tax credit limitation
for the year would be $760 ($2000 x 38%), and all $550 ($400 to France, $150 to Japan)
of its foreign tax payments would be creditable. Effectively, the $20 of formerly noncreditable French income tax would offset U.S. income tax that would otherwise be
payable with respect to the Japanese-source income. The carryover period extends the
time during which the taxpayer can look for and generate the low-taxed foreign income

15

H.R. R EP . N O . 68-179, at 22 (1924), reprin ted in 96 I NT ERN AL R EVENUE A C T S O F TH E
U NITED S TATES 1909-1950: L EGISLATIVE H ISTORIES, LA W S, A N D A DMINISTRATIVE D OCUM ENTS
(Bernard D . Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
16

H.R. R EP . 85-7 75, at 27 (1 957 ); see id. at 27-28 (listing variations between U.S. and foreign
income tax calculations).
17

Id. at 28. The carryover provision is currently codified in section 904(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
18

See E L IS A BE T H A. O W E N S , T HE F O R E IG N T AX C RED IT : A S TUDY OF THE C RED IT FO R
F OREIGN T AXES U NDER U N IT E D S TATES I NCOM E T AX L AW Pt. 5/2, at 320-321 (1957 ) (“This averaging
device, however, will not necessarily solve the problem in all cases....”).
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necessary to avoid the impact of the foreign tax credit limitation, which makes for more
effective tax planning.19
Taxpayers’ exploitation of these tax planning opportunities were partially
responsible for the Congressional decision to add the complicated “basket” system of tax
credit limitations in 1986. The basket restrictions of section 904(d) require taxpayers to
separate their foreign income, and the foreign taxes paid with respect to such income, into
“baskets” of statutorily defined types of income. Taxpayers then calculate their foreign
tax credit limitation on a basket-by-basket basis. This system prevents taxpayers from
blending credits generated by categories of traditionally low-taxed income with credits
from higher-taxed income in an effort to avoid the impact of the foreign tax credit
limitation. Blending would become more difficult in the absence of a carryover period
because taxpayers would have to ensure the exact timing of the income to be blended.
Inasmuch as taxpayers have learned to “park” foreign profits in foreign corporations for
eventual release in the form of dividend income, though, it may not be difficult enough to
justify dispensing with the basket rules.
The point here is not that the tax base harmonization will enable Congress to turn
the tax credit mechanism into a simple, elegant device; much of its complexity (as well as
its very existence) stems from the underlying reality of tax rate differentials. But tax base
harmonization may enable Congress to simplify the mechanism somewhat without
decreasing its effectiveness. That simplification can benefit both taxpayers and the
government.
Harmonization of tax base definitions also may reduce another source of
complexity in the tax system, complexity caused by instability of the tax rules. At the
very least, it should reduce the transition costs associated with attempts to use the tax
system to micro-manage the economy or “one-up” the competition. The tortured
development of the United States’ rules for allocating deductions for research and
development costs provides a textbook example of the political and administrative chaos
(and concomitant institutional costs) that can be entailed by international disparities in tax
rules.20

19

See J O S E PH I SENBERGH , I I NTERNATIO NA L T A X A TIO N : U.S. T AXATION OF F OREIGN
T AXPAYERS A N D F O R E IG N I N C OM E ¶20.6.1, at 564 (1990) (“a taxpayer with excess credits in any year
had five years under the overall limitation in which to find enough foreign-source income taxed at low
rates to absorb the excess credit amount”).
20

This history of the allocation of interest deductions is equally instructive. As that history
is the focu s of a paper written b y another scho lar, see Daniel N. Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated
Mean Better? A Critique of Alternative Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S.
Mu ltinationals, 54 T AX L. R EV . 353 (2001), there is no need to repeat it here.
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Once again, the underlying issue was (and remains) the proper operation of the
foreign tax credit limitation. The question this time was against which income to deduct
research and development expenses. The more such expenses could be deducted against
U.S. income, the larger the ratio between foreign source and worldwide income, and thus
the larger the foreign tax credit limitation amount (and the more taxpayers liked it); the
more such expenses had to be deducted against foreign income, the lower the foreign tax
credit limitation amount (and the less taxpayers liked it).
Prior to 1977, Treasury’s “sketchy” regulations implementing the statutory
allocation and apportionment requirement21 allowed taxpayers practically free rein to
deduct a disproportionate amount of such expenses against U.S. source income, thus
inaccurately inflating the foreign tax credit limitation amount.22 Concerned that taxpayers
were taking advantage of that situation by “double-dipping”, or taking deductions for the
same expenses against U.S. source income for U.S. tax purposes and foreign source
income for foreign tax purposes, in 1977, Treasury issued regulations that allocated part
of such deductions to the location in which such research and development was carried
out and part on the basis of relative sales of products within the same product category of
the products to which the research related.23 Taxpayers contended that these rules
discouraged U.S. based research and development activities because some foreign
countries allowed deductions only for research and development conducted within their
borders. This interplay of foreign law and the U.S. regulations, they claimed, in some
cases prevented an effective deduction for U.S. based research and development expenses
in any country, engendering overtaxation. The failure to take foreign law into account
when drafting these regulations, the taxpayers claimed, forced them to move their
research operations abroad.24
Apparently convinced by this argument, Congress imposed a moratorium on the
application of the 1977 regulations during the years 1981-1985, allowing all research and
development costs incurred in the United States during that period to be allocated against
U.S. source income. In 1986, Congress enacted a temporary rule allocating 50 percent of
research and development costs to the situs. Congress adopted a 64 percent situs
allocation rule in 1988, which it re-adopted as a “temporary” section 864(f) of the Code
21

See I.R.C. §§ 862(b) (for purposes of determining source of income of U.S. residents),
871(b) (for purposes of determining sou rce o f income for nonresident aliens with U.S. trades or
businesses).
22

B ORIS I. B ITTKER & L AWRENCE L OKKEN , F UN DAM ENTA LS OF I NT ERN ATIO NA L T A X A TIO N
¶ 70.10.1, at 70-46 (1998 ).
23

Treas. Reg. § 1.861-3(e).

24

W hich, of course, was precisely the response the foreign countries were ho ping for. See
Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 C O LU M . L. R EV .1151, 1233 (1988)
(“Germany and other countries must be conscious of the effect of their actions.”).
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in 1989. Section 864(f) was reenacted in 1990 and 1991, but as a practical matter
continued in force until 1993 when Congress reduced the situs allocation to 50 percent.
In part, the 1993 revision can be attributed to Congressional budget restraints. However,
by 1993, it had become clear that not even a 100 percent situs rule would be sufficient to
keep research and development activities in the U.S. (all other factors being equal);
taxpayers still would benefit by moving such operations to higher-tax jurisdictions with
similar tax rules. The foreign tax savings would outweigh any conceivable U.S. tax
detriment, particularly for taxpayers in excess credit positions. And many U.S. taxpayers
were in excess credit positions after the 1986 tax reform act.25
If countries were constrained by an international base definition, their ability to
skew rules unilaterally to attract (or repel) certain taxpayers or activities would be
severely limited. Although such unilateral actions already are constrained somewhat by
the possibility (certainty?) of retaliatory actions by other countries, this constraint is less
than totally effective. For example, the United States is currently embroiled in what
seems to be a wasteful series of tit-for-tat actions with regard to interest expenses.26 A
switch to a harmonized tax base may reduce the number, and thus the cost, of these
ultimately futile series of rule changes.
It would be wrong to regard taxpayers as helpless pawns, at the mercy of erratic
and irrational or selfish legislatures. Indeed, one of the biggest problems created by tax
base variety is that taxpayers routinely use tax base discrepancies to achieve overly
favorable tax results. How and why that happens is the focus of the next section of the
paper.
2. Taxpayer Arbitrage
Because different countries have different timing and substantive rules, a
transaction may have different tax consequences depending on the identity of the
taxpayers or the location in which is it carried out. A transaction may be treated quite
differently even by jurisdictions nominally taxing income at similar rates. Multinational
taxpayers may be penalized by such discrepancies; a transaction may generate income
subject to full taxation by two or more countries. However, most taxpayers can avoid that
unpleasant result by obtaining the appropriate tax advice in advance of structuring
significant business transactions with international implications, in short, by incurring

25

See B ORIS I. B ITTKER & L AWRENCE L OKKEN , supra note 2 2, at ¶ 70.10.5, pp. 70-75 - 70-76
(reco unting histo ry).
26

Harmonization of tax bases would not prevent countries from trying to attain similar ends
by adjusting tax rates. As I have argued elsewhere, see Julie A. Roin, Competition and Evasion:
Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 G E OR GE TO W N L.J. 543, 600 -601 (2001 ),
the relative transparency of tax rate adjustments allows public oversight of such tactics, at least in
demo cratic societies.
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administrative costs of the type previously discussed. Taxpayers’ ability to use these
differences to keep some income from being taxed anywhere poses the more critical
danger. This is the problem of “tax arbitrage.” Many examples of this phenomenon have
been exposed by the tax press. Many others undoubtedly remain undisclosed, protected
by confidentiality agreements and taxpayer self-interest. Three recent examples of this
phenomenon should suffice.
The first was the problem posed by “dual resident companies.” Because countries
use different rules to define corporate “residence” for tax purposes, some companies are
considered residents of--and were allowed to deduct their foreign losses against--two
different sets of “home country” income. For example, a U.S. company may have
claimed a deduction for the same expense against U.S. source income for U.S. tax
purposes and against U.K. source income for U.K. tax purposes. This treatment
generated a lower worldwide tax obligation than would have existed had the taxpayers
been resident solely in either of their countries of purported residence. Consequently, the
Senate Finance Committee concluded that “the dual resident company device creates an
undue incentive for U.K. corporations (and Australian corporations) to acquire U.S.
corporations and otherwise to gain an advantage in competing in the U.S. economy
against U.S. corporations.”27 At least one commentator suggested that this asymmetry is
irrelevant because a country could “facilitate a similar result by allowing their resident
companies to borrow and deduct interest on the borrowing, use the borrowed funds to
create an affiliate in a tax haven, and have that affiliate finance a U.S. acquisition with a
loan giving rise to deductible interest.”28 However, the United States (and perhaps other
countries as well) has gone to great effort to prevent its residents from achieving “similar
results” through such substitute transactions. The anti-conduit rule,29 when combined
with the earnings-stripping rule,30 prevent taxpayers from obtaining favorable tax results
under alternate structures. These legislative efforts throw the legitimacy of dual resident
transactions into question by recasting them as end-runs around the restrictions placed on
such “substitute transactions.” Of course, one may contend that it is the non-U.S. home
country jurisdiction, rather than the United States, that should be upset by this evasion.
Particularly when the rule implements a generally accepted norm (or, at least, one
accepted by the United States in drafting its own tax system), though, it is hard to see why
the United States should help countenance such schemes.

27

S. R EP . N O . 99-313, at 421 (19 86).

28

H. David Rosenbloo m, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: International Tax Arbitrage and
the “International Tax System”, 53 T AX L. R EV .137, 149 (20 00).
29

I.R.C. § 7701(l).

30

I.R.C. § 163(j).
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And even when the taxpayers (ultimately) come from a country which allows such
substitute transactions, a host country legitimately may try to reduce the opportunities for
achieving such favorable tax results. A country may decide that the increase in
investment attractiveness that comes from being the target of such arbitrage is
outweighed by the resulting revenue losses and/or competitive inefficiencies. In the most
extreme case, one could envision a situation in which no one invested in their “home”
countries; instead, all investment was transnational for tax reasons. In the best of all
worlds, only ownership and not actual business activities would be affected; the only loss
would stem from the transaction costs associated with the necessary changes in
ownership. More likely, though, some business activities would change (for the worse)
because of imbalances in capital flows or the market misperceptions of foreign owners.
A country thus may try to reduce such harms by restraining the number and amount of
instances in which this behavior occurs, even if unable to eliminate them entirely.
Congress did exactly that by enacting changes to the consolidation rules under section
1503(d) of the Internal Revenue Code in 1986--changes which of course add to the
complexity of the Code. Those changes would have been unnecessary if all countries
shared as single, exclusive definition of corporate residence.
More recently, concerns have been voiced about so-called “hybrid entities,”
companies treated as corporations under a foreign countries tax regime but as transparent,
tax “nothings” from the U.S. perspective thanks to the freedom afforded taxpayers under
the “check the box” regulations.31 Particular concern has focused on taxpayer’s ability to
use tax treaty provisions to make deductible, tax-free distributions from foreign entities.
For foreign law (including treaty) purposes, such distributions are treated as interest
payments made to a parent company. As interest, foreign law generally allows their
deduction as an expense of the foreign “subsidiary” while the applicable tax treaty
reduces or eliminates the gross withholding tax normally leveled against the recipient
parent company. Thus, no foreign tax is imposed at either subsidiary or parent level. For
U.S. tax purposes, however, these distributions are treated as having no tax import when
received by the U.S. home office of what is treated, from the U.S. perspective, to be a
single corporate unit. Taxpayers cannot make interest (or dividend) payments to
themselves. The inter-office payment is of course equally ignored when the taxpayer
computes its world-wide income, all of which is immediately taxable in the United States.
If the taxpayer is otherwise in an excess credit position, this technique creates low-taxed
foreign income which absorbs excess credits rather than creating additional U.S. income
tax liability. From a marginal perspective, such income is free of both foreign and U.S.
tax and has the added advantage (to the taxpayer) of making investment in a relatively
high-tax jurisdiction more attractive–and perhaps more attractive to the U.S. taxpayer
than to an entity wholly domestic to the high-tax jurisdiction. A wholly domestic
enterprise may be unable to lay off the tax differential between the U.S. and foreign tax

31

See Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-1 -301.7701-4, T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215.
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rates. Indeed, it was exactly such an inability of U.S. bidders faced with foreign
competitors that caused Congress to enact section 1503(d) in 1986. 32
True believers in “capital export neutrality” (who would support granting credits
for all foreign income taxes, even those that exceed those that would be imposed on the
foreign income were it earned domestically) may applaud the result of bringing the
taxpayer’s effective tax rate on the foreign investment to U.S. levels. However, even they
should object to the means by which such neutrality is achieved, because those means
encourage additional foreign investment in a (advertently or inadvertently) low-tax
jurisdiction. This contravenes the supposed justification for adhering to a capital export
neutral tax policy to begin with: preventing tax considerations from intruding into the
business decision of where to locate investment/business activities.33
Nor should proponents of capital import neutrality applaud the availability of such
arbitrage, for it does not result in all taxpayers operating in a single jurisdiction paying tax
at the same rate. The arbitrage described above allowed businesses owned by foreign
taxpayers to pay less tax than their domestic counterparts in their country of source. And
arbitrage can be used to do even more. Rather than allowing investors to benefit from
low tax rates prevailing in the countries in which they do business, some arbitrage
transactions allow investors to pay tax at rates lower than those prevailing in either their
country of residence or their country of economic source by allocating income either to no
source or to an unrelated tax haven country. Cross border income is taxed favorably
compared to income earned by the domestic residents of both countries. An example of
this sort of arbitrage is provided next.
The hybrid entities technique is a variation of a preexisting scheme that operated
by taking advantage of variations in the definition of interest and dividend income.
Taxpayers would characterize payments from their foreign subsidiaries as interest for
foreign tax purposes (thus becoming entitled to a deduction plus treaty protection) while
characterizing the receipts as dividend income in the hands of the parent for U.S. tax
purposes. Again, the object was to lessen foreign tax payments and hopefully use up (or
prevent the creation of) excess foreign tax credits. Several other variants of this scheme
exist, all of which play off the differing treatment of a foreign entity under U.S. and
foreign law.34

32

See S. Rep. No. 99-313, 99 th Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 20 (198 6).

33

See Julie A. Roin, The Grand Illusion: A Neutral System for the Taxation of International
Transactions, 75 V A . L. R EV . 919, 933 (describing the adverse effects of blending opportunities).
34

See, e.g. Thoma s R. M ay, Warn ing: H ybrid E ntities: Proceed With Caution, T AX N OTES
533, 533 (January 24, 200 0) (describing how the check-the-box regulations made “both practical and
attractive” some “international tax planning strategies” using entities “classified inconsistently under
U.S. and foreign tax law”) ; New York S tate Bar Associatio n, Notice 98-11: Tax Treatment of Hybrid
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The latest variation on this theme involves “reverse hybrids,” entities regarded as
U.S. corporations for purposes of U.S. law and fiscally transparent for purposes of foreign
law. U.S. investors use such entities to generate timing advantages.35 These structures
allow taxpayers to defer income recognition without deferring recognition and utilization
of associated foreign tax credits. Though at some point the income will have to be
recognized for U.S. tax purposes and without any tax credits (since those were claimed
and used in an earlier year), the timing mismatch can be “awfully rich” for taxpayers.36
Foreign taxpayers use these entities to obtain treaty benefits (a reduction or elimination of
source tax) for income that in practical terms is also exempt from residence country tax.37
Treasury has issued regulations38 denying U.S. treaty benefits for entities claiming fiscal
transparency in their alleged country of residence and has been working to convince other
nations to do the same (i.e. to look to the treatment of the entity in the state of alleged
residency for purposes of determining entitlement to treaty benefits), with mixed
success.39 Congress attempted to limit the availability of such treaty benefits by adding
section 894(c) to the Code in 1997.40
These are just three of the many devices which arbitraged differences between tax
base definitions to reduce taxpayers’ worldwide tax obligations to levels below those that
would have applied had the same transactions been carried out by domestic taxpayers
wholly within either of the affected countries. Some of these devices no longer work
because of intervening legislative or regulatory enactments. But innumerable others
exist, with more and different ones exploited as clever tax lawyers outpace regulators in
locating and closing off such opportunities. Although in some cases the arbitrage

Entities, T AX N OTES 877 (M ay 18, 199 8).
35

See Lee A . Shep pard , More Check-the-Box Fallout: Reverse Hybrids, 87 T AX N OTES 1196,
1196 (May 29, 2000) (using example of U.S. partnership which owns a foreign holding company
which owns a foreign operating company regarded as a passthrough under foreign law and a
corporation under U.S . law). Two years ago, Treasury issue d a no tice stating that the go vernm ent is
considering deferring foreign tax credits in these situations, but has yet to promulgate a formal policy
dealing with the issue. Id.; see also Notice 98-5, 1998 -1 C.B. 334 (19 98).
36

See Lee A . Shep pard , supra note 3 5, at 11 97 (quoting Step hen Shay).

37

See id., at 119 7-11 98.

38

See T.D . 888 9, 20 00-3 0 I.R.B. 124 , 65 Fed. Reg. 40993 (July 3, 2000), corrected
Announcement 2001-4, 2001-2 I.R.B. 286. However, the new regulations fail to deal with all the
situations in which such p roblems arise, as we ll as co vering som e innocent situations. See Lee A.
Sheppard, Hybrid Problems Continue Under Improved Treaty Regulations, 88 T AX N OTES 316 (July
17, 2000 ) (discussing remaining problems).
39

See Lee A . Shep pard , supra note 35, at 1198.

40

See I.R.C. § 89 4(c) (enacted by P.L. 1 05-3 4, § 1 054 (a)).
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between tax systems is foreseen and desired by one or both of the affected countries,41
and in others, foreseen and not desired, in most, it is fair to say, such arbitrage is neither
foreseen nor desired by either of the affected countries. These are not situations in which
a taxpayer (or a country) benefits by investing in a low-tax environment rather than a
high-tax environment; arbitrage involves the artificial (and individual) construction of a
lower tax regime by making use of the inconsistent provisions contained in two highertax regimes.
Though many allege that tax avoidance is a victimless or harmless activity, in fact,
avoidance activities create two problems. In some cases, tax avoidance requires very
little in the way of changes in behavior; its sole real-world effect is to decrease
government revenues. Those who regard this effect as harmless fail to appreciate the fact
that such lost revenue must be recouped, generally by increasing taxes on other taxpayers
or by moving to different taxing mechanisms. It is possible, but hardly plausible, that
governments systematically choose relatively less efficient taxing mechanisms in the first
instance and move to more efficient mechanisms in response to revenue shortfalls. More
likely, though, tax arbitrage, like other forms of tax shelter activity, drives up
governments’ marginal cost of funds by forcing increases in taxes that are more
distortionary than a properly operating (i.e. one with no arbitrage opportunities) income
tax system.42 In other cases, taxpayers have to undertake real changes in their business
activities to achieve the desired arbitrage gains. For tax reasons, they may build cars in
Ireland rather than the United States or France. These tax-induced departures from
baseline behavior are, by definition, inefficient and undesirable43, thus adding to the
41

The rules regarding the deduction of research and development expenses discussed above
are an example of “planned” arbitrage, initially by only one of the affected countries. In other cases,
unplanned arbitrage ma y be regarded favorab ly by one of the a ffected countries. Ne ither B ritain nor
Australia, for example, seemed to object to the effect of “hybrid entities” on the ability of their
residents to acq uire U .S. compa nies (tho ugh they did not try to protect their entities’ advantage by
protesting the Congressional action, either). Inasmuch as countries have often tried to use targeted tax
breaks to entice foreign investment, they may not be upset whe n taxpayers construct one for
themselves. On the other hand, they may object to the “unfair competition” with domestic investors
or simply feel that the investment would have been made regardless of the tax situation, and desire
greater revenue.
42

It goes without saying that if arbitrage opportunities cannot be foreclosed, another taxing
system may become preferable to the income tax system, and a well-run country would switch to that
alternate system. However, this still may leave the country in a position inferior to where it was prior
to the development of arbitrage schemes, i.e. when it had a functioning income tax system. Switching
tax regimes may make the best of a bad situation, but successfully eliminating arbitrage opportunities
may p revent that bad situation fro m arising to be gin with.
43

I do not mean to suggest that all tax-induced changes in behavior are inefficient and
undesirable; as I have mad e clear in other work , see supra note 26, it may be quite efficient from the
perspective of both taxpayers, countries and society as a whole for taxpayers to mov e business
operations from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. This article singles out only tax disparities created
by arbitrage, or the unintentional interaction of two d isparate tax system s. No legitimate purp ose is
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inefficiencies caused by revenue shortfalls. These costs may be hard to see and harder to
quantify, but they exist nonetheless.
3. Insufficiency of alternate solutions
From any single government’s point of view, it is extremely difficult to shut down
such arbitrage opportunities through minor legislative “fixes”. There are far too many
inconsistencies (and ways to use them to generate benefits or fall into traps) to construct a
rule for each one. Nor is the field a static one; other countries change their tax rules as
frequently as we do. Such changes often create new opportunities for arbitrage. And
reacting to particularly egregious abuses as they arise (more or less the U.S. strategy)
seems quite arbitrary to observers.44 Further, the retrospective nature of the remedy
maximizes political opposition to changes that benefit the government; it is always harder
to take away tax benefits taxpayers believe are “theirs” than to prevent their acquisition
ab initio.
Tax treaties in the form of bilateral agreements dividing taxing jurisdiction over
income earned in one treaty partner by a resident of the other have traditionally played a
role in ameliorating conflicting base computation rules. Traditionally, however, their
focus has been on discrepancies that operate to the detriment of taxpayers, rather than
their benefit. For example, many treaties contain “nondiscrimination” clauses mandating
equal tax treatment for fully domestic taxpayers and domestic enterprises owned by
residents of the treaty partner. They prevent source countries from imposing particularly
harsh tax rules on non-residents, rules which almost by definition will fail to correspond
with the home country tax rules. Thus, such clauses would take precedence over national
laws restricting deductions claimed by non-resident business entities, laws which
otherwise would have increased the level of source taxation by artificially increasing the
size of the tax base. Of course, the taxpayer rather than the U.S. government may be the
direct beneficiary of such clauses since the additional source taxation may have been
made non-creditable by the foreign tax credit limitation.
Admittedly, some treaties do deal with specific tax anomalies. The U.S. - India
treaty, for example, provides that the source of income derived from providing certain
technical services will depend on the location of the payor for both U.S. and Indian tax

served when a U.S. company builds a car assembly plant in Ireland because it has figured out a way
to pay taxes at an effective rate of 5 p ercent (rather than the statutory rate, app licable to Irish
companies assembling cars in Ireland, of 15%) on its Irish operations by making use of arbitrage
opportunities while Irish com panies do the sam e in the United States, taking advantage of their own
arbitrage opportunities. It is hard to see the economic or social benefits of maintaining a tax system
which enco urages cross-investment for its own sake, and not be cause of som e underlying ec onomic
or political ad vantag e.
44

See H.D avid R osenbloo m, supra note 2 8, at 15 4 .
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purposes, overriding the normal U.S. source rule in favor of the Indian one.45 Other
treaties provide for the deduction of certain types of business expenses otherwise not
allowable under foreign law. More recently, taxpayers and Treasury have begun using
treaty-based competent authority proceedings jointly to resolve transfer pricing issues.46
However, although Treasury has begun asking for treaty language aimed at prohibiting
specific arbitrage schemes,47 by their nature treaty remedies are partial and retrospective
in nature. Further, treaties are even less subject to updating and amendment than
legislation.48 Thus, like legislative “fixes,” they are unlikely to provide a systemic
solution to the problems caused by tax base differentials.
Indeed, only one solution would be truly systemic: world-wide agreement on the
definition of taxable income. International cooperation leading to the development of a
common understanding of the tax base would simultaneously render obsolete the
problems of multiple books, excess complexity, and arbitrage identified above.49 Is tax
base harmonization indeed then the next logical step, one which we should expect to see
at least seriously discussed if not adopted in the relatively near future? One might think
so. After all, in subnational jurisdictions with overlapping income tax systems, tax base

45

See Convention between the Governme nt of the United States of America and the
Governm ent of the Republic of India for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Concluded September 12, 1989, Art. 12 (Royalties
and Fees for Included Services) and Art. 25.3.b (Relief from Doub le Taxation).
46

See Rev. Proc. 96-5 3, 19 96-2 C.B . 375 (setting out procedures for initiating process); IRS
Rep orts Com pleted A PAs Reac hed R ecord High of 60 Du ring C alendar 199 9, 1995 D A IL Y T AX R EP .
14 G-1 (Jan. 21, 20 00).
47

See, e.g., Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Comm ittee on T axation befo re the Senate
Comm ittee on Foreign Relations H earing on T ax T reaties and P rotocols with Eight Countries, Joint
Committee Print JCX-53-97, Oct. 7, 1997 (testimony of Ken Kies, Chief of Staff of Joint Committee)
(proposed treaty with Austria includes an “anti-abuse rule covering certain ‘triangular cases’”); but
see Joint C omm ittee on T axation Staff Explanation o f Proposed P rotocol to U.S.-Canada Income Tax
Treaty, JCS -15-9 5, at 35 -38, M ay 23, 199 5, reprin ted in 100 D A IL Y T AX R EP ’T L-30, L-48 - L-50
(May 24, 1995) (describing “provision not found in any other treaty, that either of the Contracting
States may deny treaty benefits ‘where it can reaso nably be co ncluded that to do otherw ise would
result in an abuse of the provisions of this Convention.’”).
48

See A MER IC A N L A W I NSTITUTE , II F ED ERA L I NCOM E T AX P ROJECT, I NTERNATIONAL
A SPECTS OF U N IT E D S TATES I NCOM E T A X A TIO N : P R O P O SA LS O F T H E A M E R IC A N L A W I N S T IT U TE O N
U NITED S TATES I N C OM E T AX 12 (199 1) (“The treaty-making process is a slow and arduous one.”); H.
David Rosenbloom , Tow ard A New Tax Treaty Policy For A New Decade, 9 A MER . J. T AX P O L’Y 77,
79 (“treaties have a disturbing tendency to remain in effect long after their usefulness has been called
into question...).
49

It would not, however, lead to any improvement in the transfer pricing area. Transfer
pricing issues are high ly fact specific and it is the conflict over the legal interpretation of those facts,
rather than differences in pre vailing laws, that generally create the prob lems.
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uniformity prevails – sometimes as a matter of law imposed from above50 but sometimes
as a “spontaneous” development.51 This article argues that the path towards similar
uniformity in the international context will be much bumpier with an uncertain end.
While some of opposition to tax base harmonization may be principled,52 additional
obstacles will arise from the combination of institutional dynamics and taxpayer
reluctance feeding into those dynamics explained in Part B below.
B. The Relative Unattractiveness of Tax Base Harmonization
Though economists have emphasized the need for international tax base
harmonization – either in conjunction with or instead of tax rate harmonization – for over
thirty years,53 there has been little discussion, let alone movement, in that direction in the
income tax context. Instead, tax rate harmonization has been accorded higher priority,
despite widespread knowledge of the toothlessness of such proposals in the absence of
tax base harmonization. One of the first lessons of any tax policy class is that the
effective tax rate is a function both of the tax base and the nominal tax rate; reductions in
the tax rate can be completely offset by upward re-valuations of the tax base and visa
versa. The relative innocuousness of tax rate proposals of course may have been the
source of their legislative – and voter--appeal. Any serious tax base harmonization
proposal will significantly impinge on preexisting legislative prerogatives. In addition, it

50

See Brian J. Arnold, General Description: Canada, in C OMPARATIVE I N C OM E T A X A TIO N :
A S TRUCTURAL A N AL Y SIS 25, 2 5-26 (Hugh Au lt 199 7) (mandatory intra jurisdictional uniformity in
Canada); Peter M elz, General Description: Sweden, in id., at 97, 9 7 (sam e, in Sweden); see also
Richard Vann, Genera l Description: Australia, in id., at 5,5 (state and national income tax bases
harmonized prior to abolition of state income taxes during WW II).
51

Although not req uired by (federal) law to do so, most states of the United States which levy
income taxes do so on a base which closely corresponds to the base of the federal income tax. See
J E RO M E R. H EL LE RST EIN , W ALTER H E LL ER S TE IN & J O A N Y OUNGMAN , S T A TE A N D L OC AL T A X A TIO N
C ASES A N D M ATERIALS 406 (6 th ed. 1997) (“The outstanding characteristic of state corporate income
taxes...is their bro ad co nform ity to the federal corporate income tax base.”). Some variations remain,
both between the federal and state bases and between the bases of various states. For example, most
states reverse the federal tax code’s exclusion of interest from municipal bonds while excluding the
interest from T reasury bills; they also disallow the deduction for state and local taxes. States also
differ in their method s for allocating that base am ong themselves, utilizing different formulas. But the
basic definition s, realization rules, and structure follow the federal pattern.
52

Again, I rema in agno stic on the question of whether the eco nomic b enefits of tax base
harmoniza tion ou tweigh its costs; I am perfectly willing to believe (and intend to exp lore in another
article) that the cost-benefit calculus in the international context differs from that in the
national/subnational context.
53

The Comm ission of the European C ommunity has been recomm ending income tax base
harmonization since 198 0, with little effect. See Comm ission of the European C ommunities, Report
from the Co mmission to the Co uncil on the Sc ope for Co nvergence of Tax Systems in the Community,
S. 1/80 B ull. of the E ur. Co mmunities 13 (1980 ).
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is likely to threaten the interests of powerful taxpayers – in many cases, the very
taxpayers who would most benefit from the administrative advantages of a harmonized
rate base. This inbred resistance to tax harmonization will be hard to overcome by
appeals to others, whose interests in the issue will be far more remote.
1. Legislative Hostility to Tax Base Harmonization Proposals
National legislatures and legislators are the natural enemies of tax base
harmonization proposals. Tax base harmonization reduces legislative control over
national tax policy without creating a corresponding increase in control over world-wide
tax policy. National legislators thus would lose a significant element of political power,
power that generates benefits in the form of campaign donations, honoraria and other inkind benefits.54
No national legislature (or group of legislators within such a legislature) could
expect to exert as much control over the shape and contents of an internationally
harmonized tax base definition as they would over a national definition. Additional
interests–some of which may be at odds with domestic political considerations–will have
to be taken into account to achieve a multilateral agreement. As the number of relevant
actors increases, the amount of power exercised by each relative to the whole necessarily
decreases. Further, to preserve harmonization in future years, restrictions will doubtless
be placed on the ability of national legislatures to amend the agreed upon rules.
In theory, this loss of control over national tax policy could be offset by an
increase in the amount of control exercised over the tax rules of other nations. That is,
because tax rules would have a wider reach than before, each national legislature would
have less power over any individual rule, but the system of rules as a whole would be
much more powerful. The legislature’s power would therefore become broad and
shallow, rather than narrow and deep, but the overall amount of such power--and its
concomitant benefits--could remain the same. If one prefers to use a pie analogy,
harmonization would cause each legislature’s slice of the pie to shrink in relative terms.
However, at the same time the pie would grow in size. If the pie grew big enough, the
legislature’s (and any particular legislator’s) newly configured slice might contain the
same surface area as its original slice.
Though one might think that would mean that the new slice would be equally
capable of satisfying the legislature’s appetite for political power, several factors suggest
that most legislatures and legislators would object to a trade of this nature. And since a
54

See Richa rd L. D oernberg & Fred S . McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Du rability of Tax R eform, 71 M IN N . L. R EV .913 , 936 (1987) (in 1985, “[t]he lob byists’ payments
exceeded by over fifty percent the $32.66 million that United States taxpayers paid as salaries to the
535 senato rs and repre sentatives. The paym ents take many forms, including cam paign contributions,
speech and personal appearance ho noraria, and in-kind benefits”).
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majority of (if not all) legislatures and legislators would have to agree to harmonization
for it to become the law of the land,55 the path towards adoption would be anything but
smooth.
Even assuming national legislatures continue to have a role in determining tax
rules under a harmonized system, their power in such a world would be spread very
thinly. This would make lobbying very expensive, perhaps too expensive relative to
expected benefits for many current participants. The issue of cost goes beyond simply the
sheer number of legislatures and legislators that a lobbyist would have to persuade under
a harmonized regime to make intervention worthwhile, though that would be part of the
problem. Additional costs and difficulties will be imposed by the variety of political
traditions and alignments such lobbyists would have to work within. Many likely would
decide to abstain from the process entirely, to the detriment of national legislators.
As tax issues would not lose their importance, other actors, other lobbyists, would
undoubtedly take the place of those that dropped out. Thus a legislature as a whole (as
well as individual legislators) would, on average, retain its preexisting level of power in
a tax-harmonized world. However, that world would be considerably different,
involving new players and new issues, often with uncertain ramifications for preexisting
supporters. Nationally-based politicians may be wary of the appearance created when
forming the necessary relationships with non-nationals over tax issues; to put it bluntly,
domestic constituents with adverse interests on other issues may be suspicious of such
relationships. Given that, on average, legislatures and legislators will gain no additional
power from the move to a harmonized tax base, the considerable disruption in established
political relationships may seem too high a price to pay.
Of course, what is true “on average” may not be for individual legislatures and
legislators. Undoubtedly, some will attain relatively more power while others will
become less influential. Some legislators and legislatures may be willing to bet that they
will come out ahead, in terms of power, as a result of the changes. But at least in the
United States, there is little evidence for the proposition that politicians crave change and
risk;56 their behavior when structuring redistricting plans suggests the opposite.57 And

55

Even if adopted in the form of a treaty obligation, harmonization would require the assent
of two-thirds of the sitting Senators. U.S. Constit., art. II, § 2,cl. 2.
56

No te that legislators and legislatures would have to be risk-preferers to favor tax
harmonization, since the expected returns (looking solely from the influence perspective) of the
harmonization bet are the same as those from the status quo.
57

See Daniel H. Lowenstein and Jona than Steinberg, The Q uest for Legislative Districtin g in
the Pub lic Interest: Elusive or Illuso ry, 33 U.C.L.A. L. R EV . 1, 67 (1985 ) (“Politicians are much more
likely to be risk-avoiders tha n risk-seekers); id. at 68 & n. 167 (example of risk-averse legislators
sacrificing potential party gains for perso nal electoral safety).
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unless a majority58 of legislators believe that they personally, or their legislature as a
whole, will be better off, they will opt for the status quo.
But the most important impediment to legislative acquiescence in a harmonization
scheme comes from the probability that any such scheme would provide for the
establishment of a new, international organization for the consideration of tax legislative
proposals. In short, it would remove this area of responsibility–and political
opportunity–from the purview of the preexisting legislatures and entrust it to a newly
formed institution.
It would be hard to overstate the unwieldiness of a decision-making procedure
requiring concurrent majorities of the legislatures of all the harmonizing countries, or
even a majority of such countries. Such a procedure would be significantly more
unwieldy than the European Union’s current procedure for dealing with tax proposals,
already the subject of considerable complaint.59 And, of course, the hope would be to
encompass even more countries in the harmonization scheme, making such a procedure
even more problematic. Some method would be found to reduce the number of active
decision makers to a reasonable number.60 Even if those decision makers were drawn
from current legislative bodies (and more likely they would be chosen for technical
expertise) a significant number of current legislators could expect to be frozen out of the
new process, and the political benefits entailed by that process. Again, some individuals
may think they have a reasonable shot at these new positions, but it would require mass
delusion for the required majority of legislators to be so optimistic.
Still, one might argue that as long as national legislators and legislatures retain
control over the determination of tax rates, the virtual elimination of their influence over
the definition of the income tax base is relatively unimportant. After all, as stated earlier,
to a large extent tax rate and tax base decisions are economically interchangeable; any
change in taxable income caused by a re-definition of the tax base can be offset by a
corresponding change in tax rates. However, legislators find it much harder to vary tax
rates than tax base definitions because the former are so much easier for constituents to

58
Or a supe rmajority, in the U nited States, in the case of treaty-effectuated harmonization.
See sup ra note 55.
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The current procedure requires unanimous approval in the EU Council of Ministers, a
council composed of one representative from each of the fifteen member countries. See Joe Kirwin,
EU Commissioner to Recommend Shift in Focus from Harmonization to Tax B arriers, 26 D A IL Y T AX
R EP ’T G-1, G-1 (Feb ruary 7, 200 1).
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The details of such an arrangem ent would doubtless be the focus of some dispute. Though
one could look at the organizations of the European Union as mo dels, it is unclear whether the y would
be regarded as models for good or ill. Their “democracy deficit” has been widely criticized. See J O H N
H, J A C K SO N , W ILLIAM J. D AVEY , ET AL., L EGAL P RO BLEMS OF I NT ERN ATIO NA L E CONOMIC R E LA T IO N S :
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monitor. Hence the opportunities for delivering special favors–and receiving the
accompanying recompense–will decrease despite the economic equivalence of the two
measures. And perhaps just as importantly, they know it.
It has been almost fifty years since critics first contended that the tax code was
particularly susceptible to special interest legislation.61 These critics claimed the
technical nature of most tax legislation made it quite difficult to determine both the
identity of benefitted parties and the amounts being conferred on them, all but eliminating
the possibility of effective monitoring by outside voters in all but the most extreme
cases.62 “Pursuing this idea to a logical conclusion,”63 when one of these critics,
Professor Stanley Surrey, became Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, he suggested a
procedural change to increase the visibility of spending through tax provisions. Professor
Surrey advocated including a “tax expenditure budget,” detailing all provisions giving
“special” treatment to particular transactions or activities, in the annual federal budget.64
Professor Surrey eventually won his battle,65 but he may have lost the war. The
effect of the tax expenditure budget is debatable. Although Congressional staff members
have used this budget as a source of revenue-raisers,66 in recent years the amount of such
expenditures has been increasing. 67 Indeed, some have contended that the tax expenditure
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See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income Tax on Taxpayer
Morale, in Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Federal Tax Policy for Eco nom ic Growth and
Stability, 84 th Cong., 1 st Sess. 251, 2 52 (195 5), cited in Bo ris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal ‘Tax
Sub sidies’ In The National Budget, 22 N AT ’L T AX J. 244 , 244 (1969); W alter W . Heller, Some
Observations on the Role and Reform of the Federal Income Tax, in House Comm ittee on Ways and
Means, T ax Revision Compe ndium 181 , 190 (1959), cited in Bo ris I. Bittker, supra, at 244-45.
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64

Bo ris I. Bittker, supra note 61, at 245.

65

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 requires promulgation
of an annual tax exp enditure budget. 2 U.S .C. § 6 40(c)(3 ).
66

Sometimes too much so, in the view of some commentators . See Victor T huronyi, Tax
Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 D UKE L. J. 1155, 11 72 - 73, 1181 (1992) (decrying tendency to
repeal tax expenditure provisions fulfilling “important subsidy functions” without providing an
alternative subsidy me chanism outside the tax system).
67

See Mary L. Heen, Reinventing T ax Ex pend iture Reform: Improving Program Oversight
Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 W AKE F OREST L. R EV . 751, 784 (2000)
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budget has done more harm than good by alerting various special interest groups to the
possibilities offered by tax legislation.68 In addition, the tax expenditure budget fails to
include the full range of tax favors.69 It still remains the case that few people understand
the arcana of tax law, and as a result, Congress retains the ability to manipulate base
definitions for political ends.
At least, it has more flexibility in manipulating tax base definitions than in
changing tax rates. Sections 68 and 55(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which
“phase-out” various itemized deductions and personal exemption amounts as adjusted
gross income grows, are often described as surreptitious rate increases.70 Inasmuch as
such furtive rate changes create extraneous difficulties such as “bubbles”–places where
tax rates drop as income rises and other horizontal equity problems71--Congress would
not employ such mechanisms unless it believed that they (and by extension other tax base
manipulations) were less visible or salient to the average voter than straightforward
changes in tax rates. That is, Congress must have believed that such base manipulations
would have fewer political repercussions than outright increases in tax rates, even though
the financial impact on most taxpayers would be the same. Congress may be deluded in
this regard72 (and we will undoubtedly find out in the event a tax base harmonization
proposal becomes law), but there is no particular reason to doubt its political acumen on
this point. And that same political acumen will lead it (and probably other legislatures as

of inco me tax revenue in 199 1 to 5 9.9 percent in 19 95); Christo pher Bergin, Spending Through the
Code – The Top Ten Tax Expenditures, 78 T AX N OTES 795, 795 (1998) (“Not only does the tax
expenditure budget continue to grow , it’s growing at a fairly strong rate....The growth also illustrates
that spending through the tax code has become a pop ular pa stime again in the ‘9 0's with Washington
politicians....”).
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See, e.g., Lee A . Shep pard , The Role of the Earned Inco me Tax Cred it After We lfare
Repeal, 72 T AX N OTES 1594, 1594 (1996) (“Unfortunately, disclosure of the cost of the tax goodies
flowing largely to the rich has no t been enough to kill them; open pricing seems only to have resulted
in a more efficient auction of congressional favors.”).
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phaseouts was political deceit”); Jame s Edward Maule, Getting Hamr’d: Highest Applicable Marginal
Rates That N ail Unsu specting T axpa yers, 53 T AX N OTES 1423, 1429 (1991) (“vote-seekers use smoke
and mirrors to fabricate pipe dreams that sound appealing”).
71

See Glen E. Coven, supra note 7 0, at 51 6 & 530 .

72

Opinions are divided on this issue. Com pare Glen E. Coven, supra note 70, at 531 with
James Ed ward Maule, supra note 70, at 1429.

23

1/15 /02 d raft

well) to reject proposals for tax base harmonization even more forcefully than proposals
for tax rate harmonization.
Politicians gain power from their ability to distribute funds as well as their ability
to decide how to raise them; theoretically, tax base harmonization could increase tax
revenues sufficiently to counterbalance losses in other sources of political power. It
seems that the potential for access to additional revenues spurred some countries to agree
to the EU proposal for harmonizing income tax rates on capital income. The United
Kingdom, for example, began supporting the proposal only after it was modified to make
it easier for home countries to receive the taxes levied with respect to foreign interest
income derived by their residents.73 Other countries also became more enthusiastic after
the addition of a revenue-sharing provision.74 But tax base harmonization will not
necessarily provide governments with enough additional revenue to fully compensate
their politicians for the concomitant losses of political control.
Though some additional tax revenues will be raised by foreclosing arbitrage
opportunities, the amount that will be gained is uncertain. Most arbitrage transactions,
like tax shelter activity in general, are largely hidden from view to prevent attracting the
attention of regulators and legislators who might look for ways to foreclose them. It is
possible that the amount of revenues at stake would not justify the social costs of
harmonization.75 However, even if the revenue benefits of harmonization outweighs its
costs at a social level, the cost-benefit analysis at the legislature or individual legislator
level may be different. Put simply, control over the tax base definition gives a legislature
the power to benefit a few at the expense of the many, with concomitant side benefits for
its members. Those side benefits may lead legislators to ignore evidence of the
desirability of harmonization.
The biggest beneficiaries of arbitrage are multinational corporations; most of the
additional revenues raised by foreclosing arbitrage opportunities would be collected from
this relatively small group of taxpayers. These taxpayers, already a potent political force
in many national jurisdictions, would undoubtedly fight such attempts to increase their
tax burden. And they may well succeed, given that amounts which may be huge from the
perspective of each affected taxpayer are likely to prove insignificant on a per capita basis
for the much larger class of taxpayers as a whole. The situation fits perfectly within the

73

See Joe Kirwin, EU States Agree to Long-Term Framework For Cross-Border Tax on
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classic political choice model of concentrated minority interests facing a dispersed
majority. And even if the dollars involved were shown to be quite large–large enough to
look significant to a dispersed majority–that majority (rightly or wrongly) may assume
that the lion’s share of funds collected through the elimination of arbitrage would be
recycled to the large multinationals in some other form, rather than redounding to their
personal benefit. In short, even if their collective interest outweighs the losses that would
be suffered by multinationals, the general public may not pressure their political
representatives to adopt harmonization.
Of course, state and other subnational legislatures would have suffered
comparable losses of power from deciding to conform their tax bases to a national
definition. And while some subnational legislatures had no choice in the matter, states of
the United States were and remain free to design their tax systems however they choose,
and for the most part, have chosen not to take advantage of that power. Every state
except Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi uses federal taxable income as the starting
point for the determination of state corporate income tax liability. 76 What explains their
acceptance of a diminished stature and power? And would that explanation apply to
national governments considering the adoption of international harmonization proposals?
Several factors were (and to some extent remain) unique to the state situation.
First, the federal income tax pre-dated most state income taxes. Several states had
limited versions of a corporate income tax prior to the introduction of the federal income
tax. 77 However, the first general state income tax pre-dated the federal income tax by
only two years, while other states held off until after the advent of the federal income tax
in 1913.78 Not only did this mean that state legislators (and legislatures) had no
preexisting political or emotional commitment to an independently developed set of tax
rules, but they also lacked the opportunity to become familiar with the political benefits
associated with control over income tax rules. It is easier to give up a potential gain than
to lose a benefit one already possesses.79 Moreover, the potential for political gain at the
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state level may not have been as large as that which exists at the national level. Much
more money is at stake in the definition of income for federal tax purposes than for state
income tax purposes simply because the rates of state income tax are significantly lower
than national income tax rates. At present, Iowa levies the largest corporate income tax,
with rates ranging up to 12 percent, while the District of Columbia has the highest rate of
personal income tax, 9.5 percent.80 By contrast, federal income tax rates range from 15 to
39.6% for individuals with corporate rate ranges from 15 to 35 percent.81 Potential
taxpayers pay less attention as the dollars at stake decrease. Finally, because the number
of dollars collected through the tax is so much smaller at the state level, administrative
costs (and the potential for savings by decreasing them) loom as a larger consideration
from the governmental standpoint. The closer the state tax base to the federal tax base,
the more the state can rely and free-ride on the federal administrative efforts.
But as state income taxes have become a more significant source of state
revenues, some of this voluntary harmonization has begun to dissipate. The first
defections took the form of revisions in the formula used to apportion the income of
interstate businesses among the several states. Historically, states apportioned income for
tax purposes among themselves by applying a three-factor ratio to the interstate income.
One-third of the income was apportioned in accordance with the ratio of the company’s
in-state to total sales, another third in accordance with the ratio of the company’s in-state
to total payroll, and the last third in accordance with the ratio of the company’s in-state to
total property. However, Iowa (a state with many consumers but few interstate
producers) decided to apportion income using a superficially neutral one-factor test and
basing the allocation solely on sales. The Supreme Court upheld its right to do this in
1978.82 Other states have since followed suit, strategically picking variations on the
original formula.83
More recently, states have experimented with different methods for increasing the
amount of income subject to apportionment under their chosen formulas. Some
experimented with the inclusion of foreign source income in the apportionable base while
others broadened their definition of “unitary business” and income attributable to such a

Q UASI-R ATIONAL E CONOMICS 169, 184-86 (199 3); Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetch, & Richard Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in B EH AV IORA L L A W A N D
E CONOM ICS 211 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 1999).
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business to reduce the amount of income reportable only to the corporation’s state of
incorporation.
At present, though, states have not significantly departed from federal rules
regarding the calculation of taxpayers’ overall income. To a large extent, this may be
because they can achieve their distributional and revenue ends without straying far from
the federal base. And however much the affected taxpayers dislike the implicit tax
increases contained within adjustments to the base allocation methods, they seem to
prefer (or the state legislators think they prefer) the use of such methods to tinkering with
the federal base calculation rules.84 Concerns about administrative costs may increased
taxpayer (and voter) enthusiasm for uniformity in income–as opposed to income
allocation–calculations, just as they do the government’s. The relatively small number of
tax dollars at stake could be more easily overwhelmed by the costs of complying with (or
lobbying for) multiple disparate tax systems.
By contrast, there is little reason to believe that taxpayers will be particularly
supportive of international tax base harmonization plans. As explained in the next part,
this stems from two features peculiar to the international context: first, the costs imposed
by such plans will be far more salient, if not excessive in fact, than the benefits many
taxpayers will derive from them, and second, even those taxpayers deriving obviously
significant administrative benefits will have to weigh those benefits against the equally
obvious possibility of losing special benefits received under current tax rules.
2. Sources of Taxpayer Hostility to Uniformity
As explained in Part I, tax base uniformity has the potential for conferring both
benefits and costs on taxpayers. On the benefit side, taxpayers save administrative costs
and avoid the possibility of inadvertent double (or multiple) taxation. On the cost side,
taxpayers lose favorable arbitrage opportunities. At first glance, these costs and benefits
may appear equivalent, counterbalancing one another sufficiently to make taxpayers
relatively indifferent to tax harmonization proposals. However, such indifference is
unlikely for two reasons. First, not all taxpayers will reap administrative gains, while all
will suffer some transition costs. Second, taxpayers face not only the loss of arbitrage
opportunities, but also the possibility of losing favorable tax rules inscribed in current
statutory law. Together, these factors suggest that base harmonization proposals are more
likely to engender substantial taxpayer opposition than support.
a. Administrative costs.
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Any move towards tax base harmonization will entail substantial transition costs
because a harmonized definition of taxable income undoubtedly will differ significantly
from most if not all current national systems. Taxpayers and their advisors will have to
become familiar with the new rules, methods for transitioning between the old rules and
the new ones will have to be worked out, employees responsible for implementing the
new rules will have to be retrained and computers re-programmed. Though taxpayers (at
least in the U.S.) expect to have to endure some tax disruption on a regular basis, the
scope of this disruption–and thus its costs --may dwarf their prior experiences. Transition
costs, of course, are just that, and such one-time costs may be recouped over time as
taxpayers begin to realize their savings from uniformity. However, not all taxpayers will
realize administrative savings because many will never realize income that would have
been subjected to multiple taxing jurisdictions. Put simply, many if not most taxpayers
never were and never will be “international” taxpayers in the sense of earning income
outside their country of residence. These taxpayers will face administrative costs rather
than reaping administrative benefits from any harmonization plan.85 And as discussed
earlier, the non-administrative benefits that would accrue to these taxpayers as a result of
tax harmonization are both hard to quantify and far from salient.
This distinguishes the situation from that facing proponents of intra-national tax
harmonization. With few exceptions, the group of national income taxpayers was (and
remains) coterminous with that of sub-national income taxpayers. As a result, the vast
majority of taxpayers affected by intra-national tax base harmonization were people or
institutions subject to tax in two (or more) jurisdictions; hence, that same vast majority
benefitted from, and politically support the continuance of, the intra-national
harmonization.86 They were in a position to see the silver lining in the cloud of up-front
transition costs. Moreover, at least in the United States, those up-front costs were
relatively minor since most taxpayers had never been subject to a state income tax to
begin with.
By contrast, relatively few taxpayers in the United States derive income from
foreign sources. While the amount of foreign source income and the number of taxpayers
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These costs may be sufficiently large to outweigh the gains available from harmonization.
The move to put the United States on the metric system foundered on similar considerations; studies
concluded that the transition costs facing domestic producers engaged in solely domestic businesses
outweighed the ben efits for do mestic producers with internation al connections. See Michael
Chapman, Metrics: Mismeasuring Consumer Demand, C ONSUM ERS R ESEARCH (Feb. 1994), reprinted
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administrative costs, the gains from eliminating arbitrage may overwhelm the administrative losses.
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claiming foreign tax credits for such income have both grown dramatically in recent
years,87 their number is still small in comparison to the total number of U.S. taxpayers.
Only .14 percent of corporate returns, and 2.39 percent of individual returns, claimed
foreign tax credits in 1997 and 1998, respectively.88 The percentage earning foreign
income may be higher in other jurisdictions, but it is far from a universal characteristic of
taxpayers in any jurisdiction. Hence, a significant number of taxpayers will fail to derive
an obvious personal benefit from tax base harmonization in the form of decreased
administrative costs. Although they may not bear significant costs if the relevant portions
of the harmonized rules do not vary significantly from preexisting domestic rules, it is
hard to believe that they will become ardent (or even quiet) supporters of tax base
harmonization.
And some, those facing significant transition costs without any appreciable
offsetting benefit, will become political opponents of the change. Though one can
plausibly argue that even this latter group of taxpayers will benefit indirectly from tax
base harmonization–perhaps through higher government revenues generated by decreased
arbitrage or tax expenditures or through general increases in economic efficiency--such
long-term and impersonal (and far from guaranteed since there is no way to be sure what
the government will do with the extra revenue) benefits lack the saliency of immediate
up-front transition costs.
It also bears mentioning that the EU’s recent agreement on international rate
harmonization burdens only taxpayers earning foreign income. The harmonization
scheme may subject income earned outside a taxpayer’s country of residence to increased
taxation at source, which in turn may either lower after-tax returns or complicate home
country tax calculations for affected taxpayers. It has no direct effect on taxpayers
earning solely domestic income, though the additional revenue generated by
implementation of the plan may produce indirect benefits.
Finally, the taxpayers likely to reap the greatest administrative savings from tax
base harmonization have the most to lose on the arbitrage side; on balance, they may
oppose rather than support harmonization. Nor will they be the only taxpayers who may
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See Jeff Curry, M auree n Ke enan Kahr, and Sarah E. N utter, Individual Foreign-Earned
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end up paying higher taxes following harmonization. Any diminution in legislative power
over tax base definition will affect those used to being at the receiving end of legislative
largesse. Tax base manipulation has been an effective method of delivering subsidies to
particular interest groups. Who these groups are –and the precise nature and amount of
such subsidies–undoubtedly varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. All of those
recipients will understandably be concerned that they will lose their “special deals” in the
harmonization process.
b. Revenge of the tax expenditure addicts.
Although taxpayers are victims of the lack of harmonization, many are also its
beneficiaries. They have convinced their national legislatures to enact special tax rules
which lower their effective tax rate. These special rules (which may or may not be
desirable from a social standpoint) may not survive the harmonization process. Whether
harmonization would leave any particular taxpayer better or worse off would depend on
whether that taxpayer would derive greater benefits from harmonization than they would
lose from the elimination of special tax benefits provided by a preexisting national
regimes. But from the perspective of a given taxpayer, what matters most is whether it
thinks it will be better off with or without harmonization.
Taxpayers may overestimate their likelihood of being at the losing end of a
harmonization-induced revision of the tax base. To make a definitive calculation of
harmonization’s impact, a taxpayer would have to know what definition of taxable
income would prevail under the harmonized system. Given that this information may not
be available at the time taxpayers need to take a stand on the harmonization issue, the
stand they take will depend on their projection of what the final rules will look like.
Taxpayers may be optimistic and believe that their special benefits will be continued, or
at least survive in truncated form. However, grounds also exist for making more
pessimistic projections. After all, the impetus for harmonization comes largely from
reformers generally opposed to special tax deals, and drafting of the harmonized statute
will likely be handled by a new and unfamiliar international agency. Further, many tax
deals confer benefits precisely because they are national rather than international in scope,
or help one industry and not another. Universalizing them would eliminate the
competitive advantages they confer and thus their value to taxpayers. And it defies belief
to think that all tax deals incorporated in every countries’ tax code will survive; the
resulting code would be too complex. Taxpayers benefitting from the tax laws as
currently configured may not wish to re-open issues previously settled in their favor.
They may, in short, be risk averse.
The role played by taxpayers’ fear of losing existing tax benefits may be
elucidated by progress (or lack thereof) of the International Accounting Standard Boards
new project to “converge current international accounting standards into one global
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system.”89 The administrative advantages of convergence in accounting standards would
be quite similar to those obtainable through tax base harmonization; however, changes in
accounting standards have far less direct an impact on affected businesses than do
changes in tax laws. The absence of such economic considerations may make agreement
on a uniform accounting standard easier to reach (if it is in fact truly desirable) just as
their relative absence undoubtedly aided the process of gaining support for intra-national
base harmonization.
This sort of economic concern was largely absent in the intra-national context
because fewer taxpayers had special tax deals in place at the state level to protect.
Moreover, the outlines of the national code existed before harmonization was attempted.
And though these outlines may have lived up to some taxpayers’ worst fears, the fears of
other taxpayers would have been allayed. Finally, the means for attempting to reinstate
“missing” tax deals would have been more familiar (and thus interpreted as more
accessible) to disfavored taxpayer groups than under international harmonization
proposals. The threats naturally associated with harmonization, then, would have seemed
compelling to a smaller subset of taxpayers.
It bears emphasizing that the amount of social gain or loss from base
harmonization would not necessarily correspond to the number of taxpayers selfidentifying as losers under, and therefore opponents of, a harmonized regime, nor of the
amount of their losses. Many current tax rules are socially inefficient, perpetuated by
exactly the same public choice phenomenon detailed in this article as affecting the tax
base harmonization debate. The likelihood of eliminating at least some of these socially
inefficient tax rules90 strengthens the economic justification for harmonization even as it
lowers its political viability. While the general public regards the benefits of eliminating
these special provisions as remote and insignificant, their beneficiaries will take the
political actions necessary to protect them.
III. The Task Ahead
This combination of highly motivated opponents and a generally apathetic public
promises an uphill battle for adherents of tax base harmonization. Perhaps so uphill as to
be Sisyphean. Yet dedicated adherents will be unsatisfied with this analysis and point to
the fact that harmonization–even tax base harmonization–has been accomplished in some
circumstances. Beyond the limited (because incomplete) example of intra-state income
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taxes, they may point to the European Union’s success in harmonizing VAT tax bases as
evidence that the public choice obstacles outlined in this article can be overcome, and the
only issue is how.
Some of the paths towards harmonization simply are not viable in the context of
national income taxes. VATs, like the previously discussed state income taxes, were
relatively recent innovations at the time harmonization efforts began. At the present time,
arbitrage-related revenue losses and distortions do not appear to be massive in scope. Of
course, to some extent this is a chicken and egg problem; as previously recounted, it is
very hard to determine how much behavior has been distorted by arbitrage opportunities
because those profiting from them have an incentive (and the opportunity) to keep its
benefits secret. The question is what options are left. That is the subject of this last
section. It evaluates three possible approaches: pressing for incremental changes in the
direction of harmonization through treaties, legislative and administrative rules; trying to
achieve international recognition of the goal of tax base harmonization in the abstract,
while leaving the details of harmonization for later discussion; or presenting a thoroughly
thought out proposal for universal discussion and adoption. The question facing
harmonization proponents is which of these strategies provides the greatest likelihood of
success.
Some of the difficulties with following the first strategy have already been laid
out. Incremental changes will almost invariably be retrospective in nature. Not only will
this strategy provide taxpayers with an incentive to devise tax avoidance schemes that can
flourish during the pre-change years, it sets the stage for a continued loss of revenues as
those taxpayers profiting from such schemes band together as a political force to prevent
their closure. Congress often shies away from enacting reforms which upset “settled
expectations,” no matter how unreasonable those expectations in the first instance.
However, this approach faces a deeper problem: how to rationalize advocating
incremental changes in the direction of harmonization before harmonization has been
accepted as a goal. Particularly if other reasons (national interest, administrative
convenience, to mention just a couple) exist to support either the continuation of a
preexisting rule or its evolution into a “non-harmonious” form, appeals to the “goal of
harmonization” will likely fall on deaf ears. People do not generally allow an
unacknowledged, controversial goal to trump a traditional goal supported by obviously
laudable values.
Nonetheless, there may be some scenarios in which this approach is viable. Many
tax rules are essentially random, and can be changed without harming any discernable
interest group. Others may be of such limited effect–because so easily manipulated–that
their substance should be a matter of indifference to taxpayers and affected governments.
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At least one scholar would put the rules for allocating interest expenses in this category.91
In such cases, taxpayers may present a united front in favor of a harmonized approach
while legislators would have little to lose from acceding to their demands since there
would be few opportunities to gain from proposing an alternative approach. It is even
possible that the success of coordination in these instances would serve as an argument
for coordination in other, more contested areas.
But such wider success likely requires gaining acceptance of the goal of tax base
harmonization through other, more direct means. The real question here is whether to
pursue acceptance in the abstract or in the context of adherence to a particular proposal.
This is a difficult question, as its answer depends on a projection of how the relevant
interests are likely to respond to uncertainty. The dilemma, stated simply, is this: is it
better to be in a position of defending a known quantity, an elaborate proposal which
dispenses with uncertainty and creates definite winners and losers, or to defend an
abstract principle which has the potential to create gains or inflict losses, but whose
winners and losers (as well as the amounts of their gains and losses) have yet to be
identified? Stated in this fashion, the “answer” becomes clear: it depends on whether the
relevant interests would predict greater losses than they would actually suffer under a
specific harmonization proposal. The more optimistic taxpayers are, the more appealing
the abstraction approach; the more pessimistic, the more attractive the elaborated
approach.
There are, of course, intermediate approaches. A harmonization proposal need
not consist of actual tax rules. It instead may consist of a proposed mechanism for the
development of such rules. Possible mechanisms range from the sort of unelected
commission used in the United States to determine the closure of military bases to the
formation of a new, specially entrusted, elected, deliberative body. Either proposal would
drive home the loss of legislative power, but would do little to directly offend taxpayers
per se (except to the extent that they saw the new process as beyond their ability to lobby
and influence outcomes). Such a truncated proposal may be the easiest to develop.
On the other hand, a procedurally based proposal may stand less chance of success
than either of the more extreme approaches. It does, after all, drive home legislators’
losses without assuaging any particular taxpayer’s fears; hence, relative to a completely
unelaborated proposal, it increases opposition without necessarily increasing support.
Yet, submitting a fully elaborated harmonization proposal has its own dangers.
Once a proposal is floated, concerns about the merits of the particular proposal become
inextricably intertwined with support (or not) for the abstract goal of harmonization. In
addition to concerns about creating a group of identified and therefore vociferous losers, a
more subtle problem intrudes. Advocates of tax harmonization may be tempted to garner
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support by floating a so-called “Christmas tree” proposal–one that goes out of its way to
cater to an enormous variety of special interests to forestall organized opposition. There
is some evidence of just such behavior when other uniform laws were drafted. 92 While
such a proposal may win more adherents than other possible approaches, such a proposal
might spur a revolt by other taxpayers or tax experts, who could provide political cover
for politicians generally disinclined to adopt harmonization proposals.
As well it should, of course. After all, the point of tax base harmonization is to
improve income tax systems, to make them more efficient and more fair revenue
collection mechanisms. It seems unlikely that universal acceptance of an inferior set of
tax rules will be an improvement over the present practice of maintaining disparate
national tax regimes.
This leads to one final point. The stronger the arguments in favor of
harmonization, the less significant these public choice obstacles become. If
harmonization proponents can show that vast amounts of revenue are at stake, politicians
will accede to it. Politicians will trade a loss of power over tax policy for the additional
power created by gaining access to vast amounts of new tax revenue; similarly, the
general public may become sufficiently motivated to organize in opposition to the “tax
expenditure addicts” if the amounts at issue are large enough. There are far too many
instances in which uniform laws, such as the Uniform Commercial Code in the United
States, have been enacted and international arrangements, such as the European Union,
have been reached to argue that these public choice obstacles are insuperable.
Conclusion
The point is not that tax base harmonization cannot be achieved. If it is
sufficiently desirable, it will be. The issue is what “sufficiently desirable” means. By
outlining the various political obstacles to its adoption, the article seeks to make clear that
harmonization will not occur whenever its social benefits outweigh its social costs. An
additional–and likely quite substantial--margin will be required to overcome the
countervailing selfish, but politically powerful, interests that will be arrayed against
harmonization. One way to think of that margin is as the “public choice toll-charge,” the
price we pay for having a political system which allows legislators and legislatures
sometimes to advance their own selfish interests at the expense of the public and which
allows concentrated minority interests to profit at the expense of a dispersed minority
interest. The lack of an obvious focal point, or model, for a harmonized tax code
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See Larry E . Ribstein & B ruce K oba yashi, An Eco nom ic An alysis of Uniform State Laws,
25 J. L EG . S T U D . 145-146 (1996) (uniform law commissioners have an incentive to maximize the
number of adoptions, causing them “to be open to compro mise and acco mmoda te grou ps that could
help or hinder adoptions”); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Gro up P olitics, Federalism , and the Uniform
Process: Some Lessons From the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 M IN N . L. R EV . 123 (1993) (“interest
groups are one of the primary sources of support for the passage of the [Uniform Commercial] Code
in the state legislatures”).
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provides an additional fillip in this already difficult situation. These are hardly new or
unusual problems. They have been widely discussed in the context of domestic
legislation. But their international applications, which surely go beyond tax base
harmonization, are often ignored.
Whether this toll charge proves bothersome in the context of tax harmonization
depends largely on whether it is being paid. Is it preventing a socially beneficial tax
arrangement from being adopted? Here, one must finally confront the issue this paper has
so carefully avoided: Would international tax base harmonization be socially beneficial?
Would its benefits outweigh its costs, even if not by the margin needed for easy
evolution, or its costs outweigh its benefits? But those are questions for another day.
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